We consider the stream authentication problem when an adversary has the ability to drop, reorder or inject data in the network. We propose a coding approach for multicast stream authentication using the list-decoding property of ReedSolomon codes. We divide the data to be authenticated into a stream of packets and associate a single trapdoor hash collision for every λ n packets where λ and n are predesignated parameters. Our scheme, which is also joinable at the boundary of any n-packet block, can be viewed as an extension of Lysyanskaya, Tamassia and Triandopoulos's technique in which λ = 1. We show that by choosing λ and n appropriately, our scheme outperforms theirs in time spent for processing data at the sender and receiver. Our approach relies on the dispersion process as SAIDA and eSAIDA. Assuming that we use RSA for signing and SHA-256 for hashing, we give an approximation of the proportion of extra packets per block which could be processed via our technique with respect to the previous schemes. As example when we process λ = 1000 blocks of 2650 64-byte-packets, the gain of our scheme with respect to Lysyanskaya et al.'s is about 30%.
Introduction
Broadcast transmission enables a sender to distribute data to many receivers via a public communication channel such as the Internet. Applications cover a large scope of areas such as software updates, sensor networks and GPS signals for instance. Nevertheless, existing Internet IP protocols only provide a best-effort delivery process and the large number of receivers prevents lost content from being redistributed. Furthermore, malicious users having access to the network can perform harmful actions on the data stream. Thus, the security relies on two aspects: the network properties and opponents' computational power. In this paper, we will consider the computationally secure model for broadcast authentication. That is, the opponents have bounded computational abilities.
Many techniques have been developed to deal with multicast stream authentication [2] . Examples such as pay-TV and stock quotes involve that data stream be potentially infinite and must be consumed within short delay upon reception. Therefore, the idea of signing each packet 1 is inappropriate, as digital signatures are typically time expensive. The available transmission bandwidth does not allow the use of one-time or k-time signatures [7, 26] either because of their large size. Since non-repudiation must be provided, other techniques rely on signature amortization. This means that one signature is generated and its cost (both in time and overhead) is amortized over several packets.
In [32] , Wong and Lam built a Merkle-hash tree [15] to distribute packet hashes. This approach was also used by Karlof et al. [11] to design a one-way accumulator enabling the construction of a distillation code. Both schemes are tolerant against any kind of packet loss but the tag 2 size is logarithmic in the number of packets per block.
In [7] , Gennaro and Rohatgi proposed to sign the first stream packet and link the hash of each packet into the next one's tag. This approach is inefficient over unreliable channels since a single packet loss is enough to make the whole process fail. Therefore, Perrig et al. designed EMSS [22, 23] and MESS [23] by appending the hash of each packet to a fixed number of followers according to a specific pattern. One packet is signed from time to time to ensure non-repudiation and is always assumed to be received. Modeling the network loss pattern by a k-state Markov chain [21, 33] they provided bounds on the packet verifiability. Golle and Modadugu [8] and Miner and Staddon [16] proved other bounds based on augmented chains. To improve the efficiency for signing/verifying Gao and Yao [6] proposed to use an online/offline signature [6] to sign the first stream packet. Unfortunately, all these schemes rely on the signature reception reliability (except [32, 11] ). To overcome this problem, one possibility is to split the signature into k smaller parts where only ℓ of them (ℓ < k) are enough for recovery.
Park et al. [18, 19] and Park and Cho [20] used the Information Dispersal Algorithm [25] to design two similar schemes SAIDA and eSAIDA (the latter having a better packet verification probability). Al-Ibrahim and Pieprzyk [1] used linear equations and polynomial interpolation whereas Pannetrat and Molva [17] proposed some erasure codes to achieve signature dispersal. Nevertheless, none of these schemes tolerates a single packet injection.
Using an error-correcting code approach, Lysyanskaya et al. [12] designed a scheme resistant to packet loss and forged data injections. As the five previous schemes above, a single signature is created per block and amortized over several packets. These techniques extended the notion of packet signature to block signature.
In an earlier version of this work [29] , we proposed to decrease the time spent for signature generation and verification by creating a single signature per family of λ blocks where each of them consists of n packets. Now, we suggest to use a trapdoor hash function (THF) instead of a digital signature to ensure non-repudiation of data. This is motivated by the use of an online/offline signature relying on a THF in a recent paper by Gao and Yao [6] . Our technique will also allow any entity to join the communication group at any time by only computing a single hash value (via the THF). We will illustrate the benefit provided by our updated scheme by using a recently developed hash function called Very Smooth Hash (VSH) which can be used to build a THF [3] .
The minimal value, Λ n , of λ from which our protocol is faster than Lysyanskaya et al. ' s one remains very small. For instance, we have Λ n = 3 up to n = 2400 when using RSA and SHA-256. This value for n is much larger than the one used by Perrig et al. to implement EMSS (n = 1000). The profit of our approach is significant. For instance, we have a benefit of at least 50% more packets per block with respect to Lysyanskaya et al. ' s technique and linear equations' approach (up to n = 1530) and to SAIDA and eSAIDA (up to n = 1600). If n = 1000 then our technique provides a benefit as large as 65% more packets per block than Lysyanskaya et al.'s scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the scheme developed in [12] . In Section 3, we will introduce our modifications and prove the security of this new scheme under similar assumptions to those made in [12] . In Section 4, we will compare our extended scheme to some above ones to get an idea of the gain it provides towards them. In Section 5, we will improve the trapdoor hash collision verification complexity. The last section will summarize our contribution to the multicast stream authentication problem.
Preliminaries

Network and Adversary Models
We consider that the sender has larger computational memory storage (to buffer a part of the stream) and computational abilities than the receivers. This illustrates most cases since, in general, the sender is a server delivering data to personal computers. In the fully adversarial model, the adversary A can introduce packets into the channel, drop and rearrange some chosen original ones. Thus reliable transmission of the signature is not possible since A would only need to drop the signature packet to make the authentication scheme fail. Since the authentication problem is our major concern, we assume that a reasonable number of original packets reaches the receivers. Indeed if too many packets are discarded or modified by A then the main problem becomes data transmission since the small number of packets reaching the receivers would be useless for their original purposes even authenticated. On the other hand if too many packets are received then prevention against denial-of-service attacks becomes the main concern. We split the stream into blocks of n packets and define two parameters:
• α (0 < α ≤ 1) : the survival rate. At least αn original packets are received.
• β (β ≥ 1) : the flood rate. A maximum of βn packets reaches each receiver.
Description of Lysyanskaya et al.'s Scheme
We need to introduce the following definition. The code is called systematic since the first K symbols of any codeword are its corresponding message [13] . Given the K points {(i, y i )} i∈{1,...,K} , the polynomial p defined above is unique. To deal with packet injections, we will list-decode this SRS code using the decoder developed by [9] called GS-Decoder. It is based on the polynomial reconstruction problem, takes as input integers K, t and M couples of field elements {(x i ,ỹ i )} i∈{1,...,M } , and outputs the list of all univariate polynomialsp of degree at most K such thatỹ i =p(x i ) for at least t values of i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. It has be shown by [9] that if t > √ K M then the polynomial reconstruction problem could be solved in polynomial time. Then, it has been deduced that any [N, K] q Reed-Solomon code (systematic or not) with an error at most N − t could be list-decoded using O(N 2 ) field operations producing a list of O(1) candidates.
Let ρ be the rate of the SRS code used by [12] . Without loss of generality we can assume that ρ is a rational number (see the asymptotic analysis in Appendix C). Since
ǫ is called the tolerance parameter of the decoder. We use a signature scheme [28] (having Keygen as key generator) and a collisionresistant hash function [24] . Each block of n packets has an identification tag BID (representing its position within the whole stream). The authenticator Auth first hashes each packet and signs the concatenation of BID together with the n hashes. Then, the authentication stream S is formed as the concatenation of the n hashes and the signature. S is split into ρ n + 1 field elements over q where q = 2 |S| ρn+1 (after padding if necessary). S is encoded using the SRS[n, ρ n] q code giving n pieces of signature. Each authenticated packet is the concatenation of BID, the packet position within the block, the packet itself and the corresponding piece of signature.
From [9] , we must have t > √ K M to ensure the success of GS-Decoder. In our case, we have t = αn (minimum number of original packets arrived at the receiver end), K = ρn and M = m (number of received packets (α n ≤ m ≤ β n)). Thus, from the inequality t > √ K M , we have β n > m 1+ǫ . So, GS-Decoder can be run successfully for our choice of ρ. Since ǫ has an impact on the success of that decoder, we denote it: GS-Decoder ǫ . To fit the fact that our code is systematic, we need to modify GS-Decoder ǫ before using it for authenticating packets. The new algorithm MGS-Decoder ǫ is depicted as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 MGS-Decoder ǫ
Input: The number of packets per block n, the network characteristics α, β and m elements {(x i , y i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
1. If (m > βn) or (we have less than αn distinct values of x i ) then the algorithm rejects the input.
2. Run GS-Decoder ǫ on the m elements to get a list L of polynomials. Evaluate each Q i (X) at 1, . . . , ρ n + 1 and concatenate these values to form c i .
Output: {c 1 , . . . , c |L| }: list of candidates.
We notice that since α, β and ǫ are known, ρ can be easily computed. Thus, there is no need to consider it as an input. Now, we describe the decoding algorithm Decoder ǫ used in [12] . After verifying that the number of packets with suitable BID and packet numbering is between α n and β n, MGS-Decoder ǫ is run to obtain a list of candidates for signature verification. The list is processed until the signature is checked or the whole list is exhausted. If the MGS-Decoder ǫ rejects the input or the list is processed in vain then the family of received packets is dropped. Otherwise (i.e. the signature has been verified successfully), the good candidate is split as above (as the concatenation of the BID and n hashes). Then, each of the received packets is processed and we check whether its hash matches one of the n ones. If so, the corresponding packet is output as authentic. We now describe our improvements on this scheme.
Definition 2 ([27])
A trapdoor hash family consists of a pair (KeyGen,H) As in [12, 29] , our scheme works in such a way that a receiver only needs to get enough packets from a block before verifying it (he does not have to wait for the whole sequence). As the previous scheme, it will be joinable at any block boundary. We need a collision-resistant hash function h as well as a trapdoor hash family (KeyGen, H) where KeyGen generates the private key SK and its corresponding public key PK. We denote · · the concatenation of two elements. To set up the scheme, the sender picks a couple of elements (A, B) and computes the collision target value T := H PK (A, B). The value T is publicly known. Figure 1 gives a description of the sender's work for the sequence of blocks {B 1 , . . . , B λ }. Figure 1 : Authentication process of the extended scheme.
We keep the same definitions for n, α, β, ρ and ǫ as before. Each family {P 1 1 , . . . , P n λ } of λ n packets of the stream has an identification tag FID representing its position within the whole stream. Each one of its blocks of n packets also has a tag BID. Thus, a packet is now identified within the stream by its position i within a block BID belonging to the family FID, i.e. its identification number is (FID, BID, i) . We now describe the family authenticator AuthFamily which outputs the packets per block of n elements.
To use the same SRS code, τ c and the τ b 's (1 ≤ b ≤ λ) must be padded appropriately. If we denote H the size of a hash, C size of the c and | · | the mapping giving the size of an element then |τ b | = n H and |τ c | = λ H + C + |FID|. In our work, we can assume that λ is much smaller than n (n can be as large as 1000 for instance as in [22, 23] ). Otherwise, our scheme requires the sender to buffer too many packets to preserve the live diffusion of data. So, we will use in both Algorithm 2 AuthFamily Input: The private key SK, the target T , the network characteristics α, β, a family {P cases the SRS[n, ρ n] q code where q is the same integer as in Section 2. Thus, our extension does not increase the size of the field we work with. τ σ and τ i 's are padded according to that field.
If we do not take into account the identification number then any packet's tag is τ i BID τ i c which is the concatenation of 2 field elements. Once a generator of the extension q / 2 is chosen then any element of q requires log 2 (q) bits. So, our tag is as large as 2 log 2 (q) bits which is approximately 2 ρ H bits. Since ρ < 1, the tag is slightly larger than two hashes produced by h.
Since each block carries the collision c, it is sufficient to run the collision verification process for family FID until one of its blocks makes the authentication process successful. Therefore, when a new block of packets is received, the receiver must react differently whether the family collision has already been verified or not. We first design the signature verification routine VerifyCollisionFamily.
Algorithm 3 VerifySignatureFamily
Input: The public key PK, the target T , the network rates α, β, a set of pairs of field elements {(x i , y i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, the family FID and λ. 2. While the collision has not been verified and the list L has not been exhausted, we pick a new candidatẽ 3. If the signature has not been verified then our algorithm stops.
Output: (c, HashBlock): family collision and hashes of the λ blocks. Now, we describe our block decoder DecoderBlock ǫ . The definition of the boolean TestCollision is necessary because our scheme only checks the family collision until it is verified by one block within the family FID. Once it has been done block hashes are stored into HashBlock and only block authentications are performed. Let RP = {R 1 , . . . , R m } be the set of received packets.
After
Step 1, we renumber the remaining m ′ packets as {R
When we enter Step 4 the table HashBlock is full since the family collision has been verified.
Since a single collision is created per family of λ blocks, one might think that our scheme is only joinable at a family boundary. Nevertheless, τ 1 c , . . . , τ n c is present within each bock of n packets the sender emits. Thus, any receiver can join the communication group at any block boundary similarly to [12] .
Since the families of λ blocks are independent from each other, the security of our scheme relies on the security of a family of λ blocks. Similar to [12] , we give the following definition.
Definition 4 (KeyGenerator, Authenticator, Decoder) is a secure and (α, β)-correct multicast authentication scheme if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A wins the following game with a non-negligible probability: (i) A key pair (SK, PK) is generated by KeyGenerator. This pair of keys is used within the THF.
(ii) A is given: (a) The public key PK and (b) Oracle access to Authenticator (but A can only issue at most one query with the same family identification tag FID).
Algorithm 4 DecoderBlock ǫ Input:
The public key PK, the target T , the network rates α, β, n, FID, BID, λ, a boolean TestCollision, a Lysyanskaya et al. showed that their scheme (Keygen, Auth, Decoder ǫ ) was secure and (α, β)-correct. Following their arguments, we obtain the following result for our scheme the proof of which can be found in Appendix A. Thus, our modifications do not weaken either the security or the correctness of the technique developed by [12] . Despite finding collisions within the THF may take time, the sender only needs to perform this once per family of λ blocks. The THF enables non-repudiation of data due to its collision-resistant property (remember that the target T is public). In addition this use of a THF allows any entity to join the communication group at any time by only performing one hash computation via the THF. It is in general slower than computing one hash with a non-trapdoor hash function but much faster than verifying a digital signature as we will see in Section 4. In order to compare our protocol to those relying on the same principle, namely signature dispersal, we need to compute its cost.
For
AuthFamily requires λ (n + 1) + 1 hashes, 1 signature generation and, based on the analysis of Lysyanskaya et al.'s scheme, O(λn log n) field operations over q .
DecoderBlock ǫ is more complex to analyze since its complexity depends on the block used to successfully verify the family collision. First, we compute the cost generated by one block, say b (1 ≤ b ≤ λ), assuming that we received k packets where k ≤ βn and at least αn with right numbering. In the following, the field is the one used for the SRS code. We have two cases: Consider the whole family of λ blocks. We notice that block authentications are only processed after a successful collision verification. Denote B the block which verifies the family collision. From block 1 to B − 1, only unsuccessful collision verifications are performed (Case 1). For block B, one successful verification and one block authentication are performed (both cases). For block B + 1 to λ, only block authentications are performed (Case 2). We deduce the cost of the group of λ blocks:
We deduce the cost of the group of λ blocks: O(λ n 2 ) field operations, O(B + (λ − B + 1) n) hashes and O(B) collision verifications. We notice that the field operations complexity does not depend on the block B. We also have B ≤ λ, so B = O(λ). Therefore, we have O(λ n) hashes and O(λ) collision verifications. Nevertheless, this kind of approximation is not relevant since the number of hashes depends on the collision verifications performed. Assuming B = O(λ), we lose this dependence and therefore get two "upper bounds" which are not reached at the same time.
Comparison of Dispersal-based Schemes
Complexity Comparison
Our scheme relies on the dispersal of the hash collision so we will compare it to SAIDA, eSAIDA, linear equations scheme and the Lysyanskaya et al.'s one which rely on the identical principle of signature dispersal when they are iterated λ times. We will not consider erasure codes from [17] since they do not specify a particular class of codes. Thus, we cannot evaluate the complexity of this technique. The results of Table 1 are built based on the definitions found in [18, 19, 20, 1, 12] . We notice that the approach of [12] is much more efficient than the other three schemes on every category but signature verification. Nevertheless, this is where its strength against packet loss is. So, we can say that it is the most efficient technique using signature dispersal (amongst those quoted above). So, our focus is to compare it (when iterated λ times) to our technique. At the receiver, the complexities of both schemes seem to be equivalent but bounds (for our work) concerning hashes and signature verifications are linked together and their exact values are smaller (see Section 3). So, the complexity at the receiver is slightly better for our scheme. In Section 5, we will define a property for the rates α and β allowing O(1) for collision verifications. At the sender, we experiment the same field operations complexity but our technique computes a single signature whereas the other scheme generates λ of them. This is at the cost of λ + 1 more hashes computations.
Trapdoor Hash Function vs Digital Signature
We now justify our choice of a THF rather than a digital signature as in our original construction [29] . We will see that this decision is based on the speed of the verification process that the THF we chose exhibits compared to digital signatures. Verification speed is an important factor in the multicast context since data must be authenticated by the receivers within a short period of time upon reception.
We showed that the use of a THF enabled any entity to join the communication group and any group member to verify authenticity and get non-repudiation of data by computing a single hash. We choose a hash function called Very Smooth Hash (VSH) [3] which can be turned into a THF to illustrate the gain provided by our updated protocol. The collision resistance of VSH was proved under the computational Nontrivial Modular Square Root of Very Smooth numbers (NMSRVS) assumption meaning that solving the NMSRVS problem is as hard as factoring a hard to factor modulus [3] . In fact, we worked with a faster version of VSH (but still as secure) called Fast-VSH. According to [3] , Fast-VSH is about 26 times slower than SHA-1. They used the benchmarks by [5] as references for their comparisons (despite using a slower CPU than Dai's). This means that Fast-VSH hashes about 2.615 MB/s. Fast-VSH is a hash function which can be turned into a THF. In fact this transformation is very simple. On the input message m, we first compute its Fast-VSH value which is squared modulo an integer N (which is a parameter of Fast-VSH). The output of the THF is the reduction of that square. Thus, we can approximate the time needed to compute a value via the THF by the time needed to compute a hash via Fast-VSH and neglect the last squaring-reduction. Using Dai's benchmarks, we compared the speed of the signature We see that Fast-VSH (or its THF form) is much faster than the verification process of these signatures schemes. This will have a critical impact on the verification complexity of our construction (see Table 5 ).
Threshold Values
As said before, generating a digital signature is more time expensive than computing a hash. Since a hash function takes inputs of any length, the time spent hashing the extra quantity generated by our scheme will be more relevant than the number of extra hashes itself to get an approximation of the gain provided. Denote H the size of a hash (in bytes) produced by h, t h is time needed to hash one byte and t c the time needed to find a collision within the THF (both t h and t c must be expressed in the same unity). The extra (λ + 1) hashes are h(τ 1 ), . . . , h(τ λ ) and h 1−λ . We have: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}
If we assume that |FID| is negligible with respect to H then the size of the extra quantity to be hashed is (n + 1)λH. Since our scheme experiences no signature generation but one search for collision within the THF we deduce that our technique is the faster one if and only if:
This upper bound is logical. Indeed, K n < 0 means t s < (n + 1) H t h . Since t h is small (in comparison to t s ) and H not too large, this configuration happens when n is large enough. In that case, we have a lot more hashes per block. Thus, if λ is too large then it is faster to compute one signature per block via other protocols than all the extra hashes plus the family collision using our technique. We are interested in the case where n is reasonable and so K n > 0. We will use Fast-VSH for our comparisons. In its description, N denotes the modulus and k the largest integer value such that the product of the first k prime numbers is smaller than N . The length of the message to be hashed by Fast-VSH (in our case this message is signed using the THF version of Fast-VSH) can be any integer not exceeding 2 k−2 − 1. Given our authentication scheme the element to be signed is h 1−λ whose size is 8H bits. Fast-VSH first splits the original message into 8H k blocks. According to [4] , finding a collision (i.e. signing h 1−λ using Fast-VSH as a THF) requires one square root computation per block which is similar to performing one Rabin signing operation per block (the modulus of which is also N ). An algorithm to find such a square root is given by [14] . Thus, the value t c is:
where k is related to the Rabin modulus as said earlier. Denote Λ n := ts tcKn . We obtain: λ verifies Condition (1) if and only if λ ≥ Λ n . Thus, the Λ n 's represent the threshold values for the efficiency of our scheme. As a function of n, it is increasing since n → K n is decreasing. It should be noticed for our implementations that the size of the signature s should be the same as the Rabin modulus (on which k is based) to be relevant for our comparisons. We consider the 1024-bit signatures from Table 2 . Thus, the size of the modulus N used within Fast-VSH will be 1024 bits. It can be shown that for any 1024-bit-Rabin modulus the value of k is 131. We used two different hash functions: SHA-256 and RIPEMD-160. In our earlier version of this work, we also used MD5 and SHA-1 for our implementations. Unfortunately it has been shown by [31] and [30] that these hash functions were not collision resistant. The graphs representing n → Λ n are depicted as Figure 2 .
When Perrig et al. implemented EMSS [22, 23] , one signature packet was sent every 1000 ones. [20] used n = 200 and n = 512 to implement both SAIDA and eSAIDA. In addition, if n is too large then λn may be too important for the sender since he must buffer λn stream packets before processing. Figure 2 shows that Λ n ≤ 2 when n is up to 1000 when the generation algorithm of the signature scheme is rather slow and Λ n ≈ 9 when it is faster (using SHA-256). This is consistent with the observation done by [3] about the speed of the VSH collision finder algorithm. In addition when the size of the hash produced by h increases, so does Λ n (as a function of H). For instance, using LUC-1024, we notice that Λ n = 10 for n ≈ 10000 with SHA-256 whereas Λ n = 3 for the same value of n with RIPEMD-160. We also point out that the value of Λ n is slightly larger with this technique than in our previous work [29] for small values n. This is the price to pay to enable the receiver to speed-up the verification process (see Table 2 ). This speed-up brings important benefit when the size of the collision candidates list is large (despite still upper bounded by a constant). Furthermore, the "slope" of our curves seems to be smaller than in [29] when n gets larger. Once Λ n has been chosen as on Figure 2 , we determine the gain in term of proportion of extra packets per block our scheme provides. That is, once λ ≥ Λ n and n are fixed (Condition (1) being held) we determine n−ñ n whereñ is defined such that processing a family of λñ packets with our technique is as time consuming as λ consecutive iterations of Lysyanskaya et al.'s one with n packets per block. We also want to compute the gain of our model with respect to the schemes previously quoted. As before we need to determine the time spent at the sender for both schemes (|FID| will be considered as negligible). We denote ¶ the size of a packet (in bytes). Results are shown in Table 3 .
Our Updated Protocol
Lysyanskaya et al.'s Scheme Linear Equations SAIDA e-SAIDA (λ times) (λ times) (λ times) (λ times) 
Nevertheless, Condition (1) must hold. It can be proved that if the following two numbers do not check that inequality then none does (the proof relies on the maximality of these integers). So, we obtain the following values and then define the gain for each scheme:
is not defined otherwise
The gains are defined as: [22] and Pannetrat and Molva [17] attempted to solve two particular cases. They had two different packet sizes: 64 and 512 bytes. We chose the same ones and used SHA-256 (as hash function) and RSA-1024 (as signature scheme). Figure 3 indicates that, when λ is fixed, increasing the number of packet per block n makes the benefit decrease in all cases. Table 4 gives us an approximation of the gain provided by our scheme for P = 64. The value of λ is not added since it appears not to have an important impact on the gain. Our results also show that when n was small then the gains are close to 1. Remember that λ is fixed (so that Condition (1) holds). When n becomes small (i.e. the block size decreases) Lysyanskaya et al.'s technique and SAIDA "tends to" be similar to the sign-each approach scheme (where each packet carries its own signature) whereas our scheme "tends to" be similar a block signature scheme (with λ packets). This justifies the important gain we earn for these values of n. Our observations also indicated that when λ and n were fixed then increasing the packet size P (from 64 to 512 bytes) made the gain provided by our scheme decrease. We demonstrate these results in Appendix B.
Collision Verification Complexity
Accuracy of the Parameters
The collision verification complexity is O(λ) for our scheme which is the same as the signature complexity of Lysyanskaya et al.'s (when their technique is iterated λ times). We present a modification of our scheme allowing to have O(1) instead under some assumptions. We need to introduce the following definition. 
Definition 5 We say that a couple (A, B) of survival and flood rates is
The second condition must be true for each receiver belonging to the communication group.
Remark: We notice that, when N is fixed, (A, B) is not unique. Indeed, any (Ã,B) withB ≥ B and 0 <Ã ≤ A is also accurate for the same flow N .
In our case, we have N = n (see Step 3 of AuthFamily). Based on the work by [29] and [10] , we have the following results:
Proposition 1 If (α, β) is accurate then any set of received packets verifies the family collision using at most U (n) collision verifications where:
U (n) := 1 ρn 1 α 2 − βρ − 1 + β α 2 − βρ + 1 ρ
which turns to be O(1) as a function of the block length n (when the ratio ρ is constant).
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C. □
Theorem 2 If (α, β) is accurate then the complexity of collision verifications is O(1).
Proof. Proposition 1 states that for any family FID, the first received block will verify the family collision using O(1) collision verifications within the THF. In addition, Step 2 of DecoderBlock ǫ ensures that VerifyCollisionFamily is only run while no family collision has been found which achieves to prove our theorem. □
In Table 2 , we compared the speed of Fast-VSH and some digital signatures. It shows that the verification process of DSA and Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme are much slower than Fast-VSH's. We will now illustrate the gain provided by a THF such as Fast-VSH when exhausting a list of U (n) elements. We only consider the faster two signature schemes from Table 2 , namely: RSA and LUC. We focus on the 1024-bit version for these digital signatures. Peerig et al. [22, 23] implemented their authentication schemes using block of n = 1000 packets. Thus, we chose the same value for our comparisons. The results are shown in Table 5 where the value ρ has been chosen as half of the threshold α 2 β . We would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that before verifying the collision value, the elementh(τ 1 ) · · · h (τ λ ) FID has to be hashed using the collision-resistant hash function h (step 2 of VerificationCollisionFamily). This means that h has an impact on the overall efficiency of our construction. Nevertheless, since this digest has to be computed whatever we use a THF or a digital signature, we did not include that cost in our comparison table. This means that we assumed we had U (1000) messages of bit-length 1024 when building Table 5 : Time needed to exhaust a list of size U (1000).
In multicast communication, we want to have as few signature verifications as possible (see Section 1) . The values of U (1000) obtained in Table 5 suggest that the average number of collision verifications per packet
λ n for our scheme is small. This is confirmed by Table 6 where we studied the values
representing the average number of signature verifications per packet for Lysyanskaya et al.'s construction since U (n) is also a bound for their scheme (see Appendix C). As before, ρ was chosen as half the threshold value 
Limitations
In practical applications, it is difficult to find a couple (α, β) which is accurate and realistic due to the large number of receivers (potentially several tens of thousands). Using the remark following Definition 5, we can say that if α is "close to" 0 and β "large enough" then (α, β) is accurate for a flow of n. The drawback is that the length of the tag τ and β = 5 then we get: β α 2 = 500. So the tag is larger than 1000 hashes produced by h (since ǫ > 0). This creates too large an overhead per packet for distribution in the network. The previous values were called "unrealistic" because this choice of (α, β) means that at least 10% of the original packets and a total of no more than 5n packets are received. If these values were really accurate then it would mean that the opponent would have a very huge control over the network and the few packets the receivers would authenticate would be probably useless.
If the number of receivers is relatively small then each of them can send back a report of the transmission consisting of his own (α i , β i ) . Thus, the sender can adjust (α, β) which will be accurate for further transmission as α = min i α i and β = max i β i . Nevertheless, this approach is impracticable when the size of the communication group increases. In this case, the sender has to choose a couple (α,β) which seems suitable for a large proportion of receivers (for instance 95%) but which is not guaranteed to be accurate for all of them. Therefore, 95% of the receivers will have O(1) as signature verification complexity whereas the other ones will experience O(λ) due to potential rejects of received packets by Decoder ǫ .
Consistency of the Rates at the Receiver
As noticed above, it is important for the best benefit of our scheme to have an accurate choice for (α, β). We present a way for each receiver to check whether the value (α, β) set by the common sender is appropriate for his own terminal.
Assume that (α, β) is accurate for a particular receiver. When he gets a set S of data packets for the couple (FID,BID), two cases are possible:
1. If the collision family (for number FID) has not been verified yet then, according to Theorem 2, S verifies the collision c. That is, MGS-Decoder ǫ is run and the value c belongs to the list of candidates.
2. If the value c has been recovered then MGS-Decoder ǫ is run on the set S to try to recover the n original hashes of block numbered BID. Due to the accuracy of the rates, this process is successful. The proof is analogous to our argument for proving Theorem 2.
These two cases make us deduce:
1. For any value (FID,BID) the receiver runs at least once MGS-Decoder ǫ .
2. Each time MGS-Decoder ǫ , he recovers either the collision family value c or the n hashes of the original packets for block number BID (of family FID)
Denote B the number of values taken by (FID,BID) (i.e. the number of blocks since the receiver joined the communication group), R the number of times MGS-Decoder ǫ has been run, R + the number of familes for which MGS-Decoder ǫ has been run at least once and R S the number of times the receivers recovers c or the n hashes after running MGS-Decoder ǫ . We have: B = R + and R = R S . Notice that R + ≤ R because some sets S can run MGS-Decoder ǫ twice (once for verifying the collision family and then once for hash recovery). We define the following two ratios:
Due to the definitions of B, R, R + and R S we deduce that both ratios belong to [0, 1] . In addition if (α, β) is accurate for a receiver then ρ + = ρ S = 1. Thus if one of these two ratios becomes small (in comparison to 1) then the receiver should stop collecting data due to the lack of reliability of the network rates.
Conclusion
In 2003, Lysyanskaya et al. used Reed-Solomon codes to solve the multicast authentication problem in the fully adversarial network. Extending this approach, we designed a scheme where a single trapdoor hash function evaluation is performed is computed for every family of λ blocks of n packets. Our technique still allows any receiver to join the communication group at any block boundary by computing a single hash. The complexity at the receiver (in term of collision verifications and hash computations) is better than the complexity of λ iterations of Lysyanskaya et al.'s protocol. In particular, when the sender has knowledge of an accurate couple (α, β) for most receivers, the complexity of collision verifications for a family of λ blocks becomes O(1) (for these participants) which is the complexity of Lysyanskaya et al.'s technique for 1 block only.
The minimal value, Λ n , of λ such that our extension is the faster one at the sender remains small. For instance, Λ n = 3 up to n = 2400 for RSA and SHA-256. Thus the extra requirements consisting of buffering λ n packets is quickly amortized. Since packets are sent and authenticated per block, the throughput of data within the network does not vary too much. Our technique also allows joinability at any block boundary since the family hash collision is spread into every block. Therefore the size of the communication group can grow even after the beginning of data transmission. Furthermore, non-repudiation is ensured by a trapdoor hash function. Using VSH we showed that our technique allowed much faster verification at the receiver than Lysyanskaya et al.'s approach. This is at the cost of slightly larger values Λ n than in [29] . The gain at the sender provided by our technique is larger than 50% of extra packets per block with respect to SAIDA, eSAIDA, Lysyanskaya et al.'s and linear equations protocols up to n = 1530. This value of n should be sufficient for most live applications. We also provided a method for the receivers to check whether the common rates set up by the sender at the beginning of the transmission fit their personal network resources. queries made to it are written as (FID i , λ i , n i , α i , β i , DP i ) where DP i is the set of λ i n i data packets to be authenticated. In order to get the corresponding output, the collision is obtained by querying the collision finder algorithm within the authenticator. Following this process, A is able to break the scheme correctness since he got values FID, λ, n, α, β and a set of received packets RP BID (for some BID ∈ {1, . . . , λ}) such that:
the data packets associated with this query and AP the response given to A. In particular, we denote c the element such that: T = H PK (h 1−λ , c) where
• |RP BID ∩ AP | ≥ nα and |RP BID | ≤ β n.
• (P Since DecoderBlock ǫ first checks the family collision value and second outputs packets, TestCollision can take two different values (each of them involves a specific value of HashBlock). Thus A must be able to succeed in both following cases:
A. The set RP BID is used to verify the family collision value.
B. The family collision value has already been checked.
Case B illustrates the event when the receiver has already verified the family collision when he receives fake packets introduced by A.
Case A. Since the set RP BID verifies the family collision, the query to DecoderBlock ǫ returned a candidate h
We have two possibilities:
• Sub-case A1:
BID has been authenticated as the j th packet we must have h(P
which is a contradiction. Therefore we get: h
Remember that A cannot query Authenticator more than once per family value FID. This happened when authenticating the original family of packets: P 1 1 , . . . , P n λ . Therefore the THF is not collision-resistant since:
• Sub-case A2: P ′ j BID = ∅. Since at least α n original packets are received and |RP| ≤ β n, the consistency of MGS-Decoder ǫ involves that the output of VerifyCollisionFamily is not empty. In addition the collision resistance property of the THF implies that the values stored in HashBlock correspond to the original tag hashes h(τ 1 ), . . . , h(τ λ ). Case B. Now we consider that the collision has previously been verified. That is the receiver has buffered h
For identical reason, h(P
• Sub-case B1:
BID is a non-empty part of a received packet, the decoding algorithm DecoderBlock ǫ outputs a candidate h
BID into the output packets if and only if h(P
Since h is a collision-resistant we get: h ′ BID = h BID and for the same reason:
Thus, the THF is not collision resistant.
• Sub-case B2: P ′ j BID = ∅. Due to the consistency of MGS-Decoder ǫ [12] , DecoderBlock ǫ will include the candidate
BID be non-empty and R j BID is a received packet. In order to avoid this contraction, we must have (h
which is impossible since h is collision-resistant. Thus, we get a contradiction.
Inequality (3) . If a polynomial-time adversary A breaks the security property of the scheme than the underlying trapdoor hash function is not collision resistant. We consider the same kind of scheme as for Inequality (2) . A will succeed if one of the following will hold:
A. AuthFamily was never queried on input FID, λ, n, α, β, DP and the decoding algorithm DecoderBlock ǫ does not reject it, i.e. OP BID = ∅ where OP BID = DecoderBlock ǫ (PK, T, α, β, n, FID, BID, λ, TestCollision, HashBlock, RP BID ) with BID ∈ {1, . . . , λ}.
B. AuthFamily was queried on input FID, λ, n, α, β, DP. However, some non-empty output packet P Case A. Due to the design of DecoderBlock ǫ , the only possibilities to output non-empty packets were either (exhibiting a valid family collision and valid hashes for block BID) or (valid hashes for block BID which are consistent with the family collision and block hashes already buffered)
• Sub-case A1. Because we exhibit a valid family collision, the MGS-Decoder ǫ has output an element h
Since AuthFamily was never queried with FID, neither was the collision finder algorithm. Thus the function H PK (·, ·) is not one-way which is a required property for the hash function H PK (·, ·) (see Definition 2 and Definition 3).
• Sub-case A2. Denote c and h(τ 1 ), . . . , h(τ λ ) the valid family collision and its corresponding tags of blocks. Since P
We get a contradiction since outputting packets involves h(τ
We notice that even if we do not know all P ′ i BID 's (some can be empty), the hash h(τ ′ BID ) is known thanks to VerifyCollisionFamily.
Case B. Here, we have the same situation as Inequality (2) Case A and Sub-case B2. We get a contradiction with the security of the THF.
B Behavior of the Graphs on Figure 3
In this section, we will prove the following four results related to . C is positive since Condition (1) holds. Consider the following 6 applications:
We have:
Since P P+H > 0, f 1 is increasing. f 2 is increasing whereas f 3 is decreasing. Thus f 3 • f 2 • f 1 is decreasing. Since f 4 is decreasing we deduce that f 4 × (f 3 • f 2 • f 1 ) is decreasing. Given f 5 is decreasing we finally get that G LY is decreasing.
Sincef 1 is increasing, we deduce that G SAIDA is decreasing. c) Remember that n < (1 − ts H t h − 1). We extend G LY and G SAIDA to the following two functions:
Since 0 is an accumulation point for I, we can study the limits at this point. Let x be any real of I. We get the following two sets of inequalities: P P + H x + C ≤ P P + H x + C < P P + H x + (C + 1)
x + C ≤ ⌈x + C⌉ < x + (C + 1)
which involve:
Using the Squeezing theorem (C > 0), we deduce that both G LY and G SAIDA have a limit at 0 + and:
d) Let λ be a fixed integer and n a fixed integer such that λ ≥ Λ n . Now we consider G LY and G SAIDA as functions of the packet size P. As before we extend them to the following functions:
We define the following 5 mappings: 
C Proof of Proposition 1
We refer the reader to our original paper [29] concerning the fact that any set of received packets verifies the family collision. In this appendix, we will demonstrate the bound on the number of collision verifications to be performed since it was not studied in our original work.
Since T ≤ n and N ≤ β n, we get:
Since L(T, N ) is an integer, we obtain: L(T, N ) ≤ U (n).
Notice that we could prove that U (n) is an upper bound for the construction by [12] in a similar way.
C.2 Asymptotic Analysis of the Bound
As in [12] , we consider that ρ is a constant when studying the asymptotic behavior of U (n). Nevertheless, ρ n must be an integer. Therefore, the limit of U (n) can only be studied for values n in I ρ := {n : ρ n ∈ ℕ}. A necessary and sufficient condition to study the limit in +∞ is to have an infinite number of elements in I ρ since I ρ is a subset of ℕ. Remember that ρ is a (positive) rational number (see Section 2). Thus we can write ρ = uρ vρ where u ρ and v ρ are elements of ℕ. If we consider ℕv ρ , the subset of ℕ representing the multiples of v ρ , then: ℕv ρ ⊂ I ρ . Since ℕv ρ is infinite, so is I ρ . Therefore, we can study the asymptotic behavior of U (n) as soon as ρ is a rational number (see Section 2). Let n be any element of I ρ . We have:
We have: lim Therefore, U (n) ∈ O(1) which achieves to prove our theorem.
